The rest of the C2 iceberg. (2024)

Perhaps nothing is more human than to assume that things easilyseen are more real and important than those largely hidden from view.Take icebergs, for example. Typically, we focus on the highly visibletips of icebergs above the water's surface rather than the muchlarger masses of ice hidden from us under the cold, dark water. We failto appreciate how much the tip depends on all of that mass below it inorder to float and how much additional mass is hidden from our view.

In many ways, it's the same story with Air Force command andcontrol (C2). Over the last couple of decades, the US Air Force haspioneered and developed a C2 enterprise for joint and coalition airpowerthat is rivaled by none. (1) When we describe it, we tend to emphasizethe highly visible aspects of tactical employment, like themission-package coordination and tactical execution activities practicedin every Red Flag exercise. (2) As one would expect, however, there ismuch, much more to the C2 story in terms of who created the plan andwhether it will contribute to our desired strategic outcomes.

As we make difficult choices in an era of reduced resources, wemust ensure that we do not lose sight of the people, processes, andideas that help link our tactical actions to desired strategic outcomes.This article describes the foundational C2 concepts that comprise the"entire C2 iceberg." After a brief discussion of the morefamiliar "tip of the C2 iceberg," it then addresses "therest of the C2 iceberg"--the people, processes, and products thatconstitute the air tasking cycle in component major command and numberedair force headquarters. For our purposes--and to suggest a usefuldistinction not discriminatingly demarcated in Air Force C2doctrine--the article refers to these as component headquarters commandand control (CHQ C2). It lays out current threats to CHQ C2, includingcognitive traps, systemic factors, and "systems illiteracy,"all of which currently work to weaken our entire C2 system design--and,ultimately, our strategic performance--from within. Finally, the articlediscusses what can be done to ensure that the Air Force'soperational-level C2 skills maintain pace with our tactical prowess,assuring that this prowess--as well as the Air Force itself--remainsrelevant in future security environments.

The Whole Iceberg: Fundamental Functions of C2

Military historian Martin van Creveld observed, "As even acursory look at their nature will reveal, the functions of command areeternal. Provided he had a force of any size at his disposal, astone-age chieftain would be confronted with every single one of them,just as is his present day successor." (3) A functional approach toC2 system design anchors planners in the fundamentals of what must bedone in C2 operations before getting specific about how to do it or whoshould do it. In a metaphorical sense, let us lift the entire C2iceberg, step back far enough to see the whole thing, and describe whatit does.

According to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms, command and control is"the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designatedcommander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of themission." (4) Thus, the two most essential elements are (1) acommander who has the authority to assign missions and direct forces toaccomplish them and (2) a system through which the commander can controlhis or her forces to carry out that mission.

Commanders exercise command through use of a C2 system, defined inJP 1-02 as "the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, andcontrolling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missionsassigned." (5) Thus, the design of a C2 system must concentrate onserving the needs and requirements of the commander and the mission. Thesystem's design must have the ability to flex to both theindividual commander's specific requirements and the ever-changingmission environment. As described in the 1989 RAND study CommandConcepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control, theessence of C2 is developing, transmitting, and executing the"command concept," which only the commander has the authorityto develop and promulgate:

 Going beyond personality alone, ... the essence of command lies in the cognitive processes of the commander--not so much the way certain people do think or should think as the ideas that motivate command decisions and serve as the basis of control actions: Ideally, the commander has a prior concept of impending operations that cues him (and his C2 system) to look for certain pieces of information. Our theory cuts through the technological overlay that now burdens the subject ... [and] represents an attempt to separate the intellectual performance of the commander from the technical performance of the C2 system. (6)

In other words, the critical minimum infrastructure of a holisticC2 system cannot be determined generically or agnostically; rather, itis entirely dependent upon the commander's requirements, givenspecific missions to accomplish under specific conditions. This C2system is then used to translate the specific command concept intomeaningful, collective action.

Holistic C2 systems, however constructed, must be adequate to matchthe needs of the commander, whose responsibility can range from verysmall areas of interest in the case of a highly specialized task forceto the breadth of the entire globe in the case of a functional combatantcommand. At a minimum, they must

* build situational awareness (keep the commander and staffinformed of the current situation and his/her guidance from higherheadquarters);

* translate commander's intent (assist the commander in thedevelopment and communication of the command concept [which includesboth their organizational and operational concepts]);

* produce feasible plans (disseminate the command concept tosubordinates in clear and unambiguous terms); and

* conduct mission control (be sufficient to monitor and control theexecution actions of subordinates to the minimum degree required toaccomplish the commander's concept, and to allow the commander toissue new instructions when the situation and/or the commander'sconcept changes).

Any discussion of holistic C2 systems, under contested conditionsor otherwise, will concentrate on supporting these most basic functions.It is the job of the commanders and the staff to build and adapt the C2system to meet those parameters in each case, and there is seldom onlyone feasible and acceptable way to do it. No matter how it is done, theC2 system serves as an extension of the commander and thus can never bedivorced from human interaction.

"The Tip" versus "the Rest" of the C2 Iceberg

When we talk about C2 in the context of Air Force tacticalemployment, we usually have in mind the C2 elements that execute the airtasking order (ATO)--the Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS),Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), control andreporting center (CRC), air support operations center (ASOC), and airand space operations center (AOC) combat operations division (COD). (7)Typically, personnel receive training in these elements during commonexercises such as Red Flag (live fly) and Virtual Flag (simulated flightenvironments), in which we sharpen our execution tactics, techniques,and procedures. The C2 elements above--the ones focused on executing thecurrent plan in real time--can be thought of as the tip of ourmetaphorical C2 iceberg. They serve as connections to the larger C2system that almost all operators became familiar with early in theirinitial tactical assignments. Other vital actions support employment(e.g., space enhancement and cyber activities), but this articleexamines the central tasking processes for air-breathing assets.

The rest of the iceberg includes everything that produces theoverarching plan which allows commanders to translate their strategyinto the operations and tasks that will fulfill the mission. The rest ofthe iceberg creates the conceptual and logistical underpinnings of thejoint campaign executed by mission commanders at the tip of the iceberg.This requires a blend of operational art and science as well as theability to negotiate complex bureaucratic environments. (8) C2 systemsliteracy--the construction of sufficiently accurate individual andcollective mental models of the world with which to take usefulaction--involves understanding the whole C2 iceberg and the dynamicorganizational processes that keep it afloat (see the figure below).

In the US Air Force, the rest of the iceberg deals with componentmajor command or component numbered air force processes that supportspecific geographic and functional combatant commanders. (9) These canbe described generically as the component headquarters or CHQ each ofwhich has an Air Force forces (AFFOR) commander and staff who presentforces to the joint force commander and deal with Air Forceservice-specific issues as a "force provider." It alsoincludes the AOC, with the trained and proficient core of a joint orcoalition air operations center (JAOC/CAOC) staff. (10) When the jointtask force (JTF) commander establishes functional components, the jointforce air component commander (JFACC) uses the jointly manned JAOC/ CAOCto perform operational missions as a "force consumer." Thecommander of Air Force forces is always an Air Force commander andtypically "dual hatted" as the JFACC although a JFACC can bean Airman from any service. Furthermore a JAOC should always be jointlymanned with augmentees from the other service and coalition components.In practice, it is not unusual for the deputy JFACC to be an aviatorfrom another service or coalition military partner. Air Forceoperational forces are normally presented to the joint force as an airexpeditionary task force (AETF) in accordance with joint and servicedoctrine. (11)

The organizational skills required of commanders and their staffsto perform well in the rest of the iceberg are not the same as thosetactical skills needed to succeed in the tip although having an in-depthunderstanding of tip activities is absolutely critical to buildingfeasible plans in the rest of the iceberg. (12) Practitioners of CHQ C2must be able to think beyond their tactical "family of origin"weapons systems and understand how the various joint and coalitionforces can fit together into a coherent scheme of maneuver. Air plannersin the JAOC are specifically trained in the joint operation planningprocess for air but also support the parallel joint operation planningprocess performed by JTF headquarters. (13) Thus, they must be familiarwith multiple joint and functional operational-art concepts, doctrine,and terms. Moreover, they must be able to translate between them as theyproduce air component supporting plans to the joint campaign. (14) CHQplanners must work with various embedded liaisons from other agencies tocoordinate integrated planning. Above all, they must focus theseprocesses on getting the right decision-quality information to theappropriate commanders, who then use the same system to assess thesituation, choose courses of action, accept risk, disseminate theirguidance, and assign concrete tasks to the tactical units in the tip.

Just as one must understand aerodynamics, engineering,thermodynamics, computer science, and more when designing and operatingaircraft, so must people who design and operate C2 systems grasp theorganizational theories and concepts inherent to CHQ C2. They must beversed in group decision-making theories, jargon used in operationalgraphics and orders production, war gaming, operational analysis,communications network architecture, and information security. Theseconcepts, and many others not detailed here, are like the crystallinestructure upon which the collective strength of the entire C2 icebergdepends.

These people, processes, and tools of CHQ C2 bring predictability,rigor, and discipline to the air tasking cycle, which is very importantto a process in which seemingly minute details can often have adisproportionately large impact on effectiveness during execution. Theyenable the detailed integration of many assets from many locations, helpto eliminate costly resource mismatches and targeting errors, identifyoperational limits, and create the cognitive and logistical backbone ofthe plan that the COD and its subordinate tactical C2 elements can thenmodify as needed on the day of execution. Shortcutting this process maybe necessary at times or even desirable, but doing so almost alwayscomes with additional costs in a systemic sense: it usually increasesstrategic and operational risk when careful target analysis andweaponeering, requirements resourcing, deconfliction of friendly forces,synchronization of supporting effects, collateral damage estimates, andso forth, are abbreviated or omitted for the sake of operationalurgency. For very good reasons, these processes and procedures havewithstood the test of time and should be the entering argument for theevolution of our C2 systems. Those who fail to understand the holisticnature of the system when offering alterative solutions risk introducinginternal threats to our C2 excellence.

Threats to C2 Excellence

Complacency in C2 System Design

Often, long periods of success without serious challenge lead tocomplacency. When something is done well for a long period with fewnotable mishaps, the human tendency is to forget lessons previouslylearned, become comfortable, and assume that the future will closelyresemble the past. When this happens, it becomes very difficult torecognize game-changing events in the operational environment--that is,until it is too late. Four conditions that we have collectively becomeaccustomed to over decades of deployed combat operations may lead tocognitive complacency in the design and maintenance of C2 systems.

The "recent" operational environments have been largelystatic and predictable compared to likely future conflicts. The AirForce can be proud of the service provided to the joint force in areaslike ISR, close air support, air mobility, tactical C2, personnelrecovery, and medical evacuation. Much has been accomplished withrelatively few assets--and made to look relatively easy in most casesdue to a permissive air-threat situation, sufficient basing, and thefairly static nature of associated logistical problems. This operationalenvironment allowed incremental improvements, added by a succession ofstaffs over time. However, many of the professionals responsible forthese improvements have largely moved out of C2 assignments, takingtheir experience and understanding with them.

The operational C2 environment has been tactically focused onground operations rather than robust, multidomain campaigns. Although wehave trained CHQs with robust scenarios in Blue Flag and other higherheadquarters command post exercises, funding for those activities hasbeen significantly curtailed or eliminated, with many being cancelled orrelegated to "tabletop only" status. (15) We are rapidlyapproaching a point where some CHQ staff members will never have seen"what right looks like" regarding the full CHQ C2 requirementsfor high-intensity major combat operations.

We have slowly regressed to simpler processes and products thatwill not support higher-intensity war fighting, to the detriment ofhigh-level C2 skills. Our total weight of effort in US CentralCommand's area of responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) has been low enoughthat we have been able to plan and track the entire ATO using basicMicrosoft Office tools. At the same time, our skills with the toolsnecessary for planning major combat operations via theater battlemanagement core systems applications have atrophied. (16) It has beenlogical to do so--there is no reason to make a task more difficultduring actual combat operations when something less complex worksbetter. However, we need to recognize that the less simplified processesof today may be completely unsuitable to handle more complex issuestomorrow. Now is the appropriate time to challenge ourselves and regainthe skills needed for a much higher-demand signal from airpower.

Our ability to conduct C2 has not been significantly contested.Conventional wisdom requires us to consider the likelihood of contestedand degraded operations, but we have only recently begun consideringtheir implications for CHQ C2. Currently, we can coordinate thesimultaneous actions of military forces around the globe and performfeats of synchronization and precision of which futurists of old couldonly dream. Allowing ourselves to become more dependent on our tools, wemay have lost touch with many of the basic tenets of C2. Articulatingthe fundamental challenges and trade-offs of C2 across the entire combatair forces (specifically those in operations) will help us takeproactive measures to protect our C2 in contested environments. Thiswill also help us avoid the "one size fits all" mentality thatnever addresses all of the problems involved in a contested and degradedoperations scenario.

Threats from Systemic Factors

Because C2 has been "assured" in the conditions describedabove, an enterprise-level solution has not developed to address somesystemic matters that threaten our C2 expertise in terms of managinghuman capital and resources. We must address eight emerging issues.

C2 demand signals and resource allocations are going in oppositedirections. At the very time that more institutional C2 knowledge andexperience are needed to deal with near-peer challenges as called for inthe Joint Operational Access Concept and supporting concepts like theAir Sea Battle Concept, our C2 resources either remain static ordecrease. (17)

C2 experience in the staffs is decreasing because of personnelpolicies, including the present system of career incentives. A careerfield for air battle managers in the AWACS and CRC exists, but there isno similar career field at the CHQ C2 level in the Air Force that helpsthe Air Force Personnel Center match people with the organizationalexperiences discussed previously with CHQ C2 assignments. Because of thelack of a career field for CHQ C2 operational-level planners--and veryfew opportunities for squadron command outside a small number of AOCtraining and testing squadrons--our brightest future leaders (whousually understand the tactical tilt of the Air Force system very well)enjoy few career incentives to seek CHQ C2 assignments actively.Ironically, these AOC and AFFOR assignments would prepare someone foroperational and strategic command later as an AFFOR and AOC divisiondirector, AOC commander, and JFACC. Instead, these assignments tend tohurt rather than help chances for promotion to senior rank. (18) As aresult, those who do attain senior rank usually do so through asuccession of mostly tactical assignments or staff assignments otherthan those in CHQ C2. Often, these officers end up making majordecisions that affect the future of the AOC and AFFOR albeit without thefull understanding of what CHQs do and what sustaining and modernizingthem requires. Talent and intelligence can make up for manydeficiencies; the leaders we get through the mandatory path of tacticalassignments at the squadron, group, and wing levels usually have thosequalities in abundance. However, the development of expertise in acomplex enterprise carries fundamental demands for focused engagementwith the conceptual elements over time to cultivate intuition,expertise, and mastery. Sometimes there is simply no substitute for timeand experience under actual conditions to become truly proficient. (19)When it comes to the complexities of CHQ C2, no crash course can teachpersonnel all they need to know, no matter how talented the students maybe.

C2 is not in our cultural DNA, as are tactical weapons systems.Despite its foundational importance, joint and combinedorganizational-level C2 is difficult to visualize and even moredifficult to fit into service narratives that we use to describe ourorganizational essence. Good Air Force commanders have traditionallyrecognized the importance of organizational-level operational C2--hence,the AOC and AFFOR construct. However, few senior leaders have anemotional attachment to C2 in the same way they do airframes, leading toa subtle bias towards the tip-of-the-iceberg systems that mostindividuals have more familiarity with from their tactical backgrounds.The Air Force's service culture reinforces this propensity to valuetactical operations and advanced technologies over operational-levelcompetency. (20) When C2 initiatives have to compete for preciousattention and resources, commanders may tend to fall back on theheuristics emphasized by their personal experience in tacticalassignments and deemphasize less familiar CHQ programs, even if they arecritical to future success from a larger, much more systemicperspective. (21)

Some legacy CHQ C2 training has already fallen victim to budgetpressures. AOC initial qualification training has been normalized in theprogram objective memorandum (POM), but both in-residence advanced AOCtraining (the Command and Control Warrior Advanced Course or C2WAC) andinitial AFFOR training have been curtailed in recent years because of alack of funding rather than a lack of demand in the field. Blue Flag,the operational AOC training specifically designed to train AOC, jointair component coordination element (JACCE), and AFFOR personnel in thefull range of air tasking cycle processes, has already been cut infiscal years 2014 and 2015 due to budget pressures, increasing the riskthat personnel assigned to the AOC and AFFOR will not experiencerealistic CHQ C2 battle-rhythm processes until an actual contingencyoccurs. Emphasis on operational planning has improved in Air Forceprofessional military education (PME) for officers (specifically, AirCommand and Staff College), but many officers assigned to AOC and AFFORstaffs do not attend those courses before receiving their AOC, JACCE,and AFFOR assignments. Budget pressures have eliminated CHQ C2 trainingpreviously offered by the 505th Command and Control Wing at HurlburtField, Florida, to students of the School of Advanced Air and SpaceStudies despite the high probability that many of its graduates will beassigned to high-impact CHQ C2 jobs after graduation. (22) The servicehas never offered a formal course to train members of the JACCE,regardless of the critical role they play in connecting higherheadquarters and functional component planning with centralized airplanning in the JAOC. (23)

Cessation of in-residence AFFOR and advanced training createssystemic effects in the C2 force. When the people selected for these CHQassignments do not have formal training in the basics, they do the bestthey can when they get there. They take the initiative and developprocedures on their own that address the exigencies of the particularmoment. Nevertheless, these local solutions usually are neither scalableto different levels of intensity nor translatable to other headquarters.Over time, this situation creates a pernicious effect on the aggregatelevels of C2 experience and understanding across the force, makingadaptation to different situations or combining personnel from variousCHQs in an emergency situation a much more intractable problem. Theresult, validated by our own historical experience before establishmentof the CHQ C2 processes, is extended C2 "pickup games" andprocess disconnects during critical moments of escalation and conflict.

The lack of proper understanding of CHQ C2 and of sufficientdoctrinal terminology to distinguish "tip" from"rest" functions creates the illusion that we are adequatelyaddressing C2 from an institutional perspective. Because we don'tmake a clear doctrinal distinction between the mostly tactical C2processes in the tip and the mostly bureaucratic C2 processes involvedin CHQ C2 in the rest of the iceberg, we tend to talk past each otherwhen we mention C2 generically among different C2-related activities.Sometimes the false impression that "C2 is covered" encouragesus to neglect some critical aspects entirely (e.g., CHQ advancedtraining and career management) in our steady-state budgeting andprogramming and personnel system. Air battle managers are considered adistinct C2 career field, and many of them later become excellentleaders in CHQ C2 organizations, but their normal duties in the JSTARS,AWACS, and CRC do not specifically prepare them for CHQ assignments ormake them CHQ C2 process experts upon initial arrival. POM normalizationfor AOC initial qualification training has been very beneficial andstabilizing for initial training, but failure to fund the AOC simulationcapabilities and their upgrades threatens our ability to providemission-qualification training once the students leave the schoolhouse.

CHQ C2 systems illiteracy leads directly to strategic illiteracyand service irrelevance. As a distinguished Air Force strategist onceremarked, "You're not a strategist unless you're astrategist of bureaucracy." (24) The best strategy is uselessunless one understands and knows how to maneuver through the socialsystems in which strategy is informed, formed into a plan, andtransformed into taskings. Further, as the venerable physicist StephenHawking once said, "The greatest enemy of knowledge is notignorance; it is the illusion of knowledge." (25) If leaders riseto rank primarily through demonstrating tactical excellence without therequisite CHQ experience and awareness to understand the relevantissues, they probably will not make the right decisions, no matter howwell intentioned, intelligent, or talented they are.

Systemic deficiencies have been concealed by abundant resourcing sofar, but that is about to end. In an era of funding for overseascontingency operations, we have often been able to address systemicinattention to CHQ C2 via rapid-acquisition programs and fallout funds.In times of budget austerity, this is less likely to happen. Our abilityto create local "bailing wire and paper clip" solutions for C2technical issues is not going to keep pace with the rate of change assome parts of the C2 system are upgraded through normalized POM inputswhile others are neglected. (26)

Faulty C2 Assumptions Caused by Systems Illiteracy

As we explore alternative options to the current AOC and AFFORconstructs in the future, we must be cautious not to oversimplify theproblem with proposed solutions that do not acknowledge the full depthof our current C2 processes. Each process has evolved out of necessityto add depth and rigor to the air tasking process, and significant risksmay arise if its contributions--and the reasons they were introduced inthe first place--are not fully understood. Unless one is truly"systems literate" and considers the whole of the C2 issuebefore offering simplifying prescriptions, proposals to modify our C2will probably solve only part of the problem and may make its otherparts worse. Knowledge of foundational C2 theory validated by a thoroughunderstanding of history suggests that the following general assumptionsabout C2 are fundamentally flawed unless they are carefully qualified.

We can automate situational awareness and eliminate the fog of warthrough technology. (27) Airpower is not just about collecting data,looking for patterns, and selecting the right preprogrammed decisionalgorithm to activate or deactivate strike packages. It is much morecomplex, involving an understanding of the entire environment andchoosing multiple responses to shape outcomes favorably across thephysical, cognitive, and moral domains. (28) In war the desired ends arepolitical effects, which are social constructs by definition. Humans inthe loop--more specifically, groups of them working in concert--arestill the only parallel processors capable of deducing social contextfrom the results of potential or actual tactical actions. (29) Even thebest algorithms behind automated "big data" analysis depend onassumptions built into their search algorithms, ones developed ahead ofactual events that may not yield appropriate insights when socialcontexts change faster than the algorithm can be reprogrammed. Anyproposed operational concept that treats air warfare as reducible to atargeting exercise against certain types of targets--and nothingmore--is fundamentally flawed from inception. (30)

We can automate the planning process and gain efficiencies inpersonnel. Blanket information technology solutions, even when wellfunded, can seldom adapt to very different requirements driven bycomplex joint and coalition operations. If an automated data-collectionprocess is not configured to "ask" the right questions or themeans of displaying information does not match the way that rotatingcommanders visualize and absorb information, then the tool will actuallyhinder effective C2. This is a general truth of any complexsituation--as the system becomes more complex, "blanketsolution" attempts to control them tend to generate more unintendedconsequences.

We can centralize all of the global requirements for "functionX" in one place to gain efficiencies in personnel. Because thesocial interface prevents full automation of C2 decision making, any C2system has fundamental human-cognitive load limits. One has only limitedtime to build the situational awareness and context needed to correctlyinterpret the information received by humans in the loop. Although itmay be possible to centralize some very discrete functions that do notrequire screening for social context (e.g., weaponeering analysis ondiscrete target sets or imagery analysis), the artificial intelligencerequired to do so with the entire C2 enterprise does not yet exist andnever will as long as social effects matter. Detailed contextualknowledge is needed to estimate the social effect that airpower actionswill have in specific areas and contexts; thus, generalists withwide-area or global responsibilities are less likely to draw correctconclusions looking at the same data as a specialist intimately familiarwith local contexts. Air strategy is not simply a matter of hittingtargets in a mechanistic fashion--it's about knowing which targetsmatter in a social sense and why. Consequently, one needs specific areaexpertise and concentration in areas like geography, economics, localculture, threats, doctrine, and so forth.

We can conduct all of our planning via distributed means. The AirForce learned the importance of "actual presence" the hard wayduring development of the JACCE, whereby possessing a "seat at thetable" became a requirement to have a voice in the plan. (31) Thiscomes down to basic human psychology. We communicate and form trustprimarily through receiving nonverbal cues of intent, embodied in whatare often unconscious cues passed through gesture and tone of voice, andphysical cues that affect our perceptions of trustworthiness in others.(32) Without these, we become suspicious of each other and fill in themissing data with stereotypes that often erode trust and communication.The effect of being on different sleep cycles further reinforces themisperception that distributed planning efforts are not supporting andoften run counter to the requirements of war fighters closer to thefight. As anyone who has served in the CENTCOM AOR can attest, it isusually impossible to get anything done with a higher headquarters backhome until afternoon, CENTCOM time, and the questions from thatheadquarters usually arrive at the same time deployed planners are readyto turn in for the night.

We also need to acknowledge that not all critical C2 processeshappen during scheduled battle-rhythm events and that having forwardplanning presence and personal relationships with the key planners iscritical to joint planning and execution. Without liaisons and regularbattlefield circulation, the air component has less influence in shapingthe initial presentation of joint courses of action, which tend todominate the discussion over subsequent suggestions, even the sounderones--another documented cognitive bias that is largely subconscious. Afinal opportunity lost by not having a forward geographic presence isthe prospect of chance meetings with planners of the other services.These often lead to better solutions and detection of previously unknownproblems that may never surface during preplanned battle-rhythmdistributed meetings in which the social pressures of rank andprecedence may restrict free discussion or sidebars that often generatethe most creative solutions.

Most C2 functions can be distributed to subordinate units andentities. The C2 system necessary to carry out the mission is completelydependent on what the mission is--there is no universal solution for C2.As long as the system can perform the basicstrategy-to-task-to-assessment processes described at the beginning ofthis article and personnel can accomplish their mission in theconditions they encounter, the C2 system is adequate, even without allof the processes in the iceberg. But oftentimes the AOC and AFFORprocesses developed the way they did for good reasons. Before optionsfor distribution or consolidation of functions are considered,commanders must understand the impact on their ability to control forceseffectively and efficiently when assumptions prove incorrect--whenfriction and chance enter the equation. Commanders must realize thatwhen they delegate control, they also delegate risk acceptance. If thedistributed node does not have the expertise, situational awareness, orspan of control necessary to make good command and risk decisions, thendelegation of C2 may prove worse than taking an operational pause whilethe CHQ C2 elements reconstitute their critical processes. This isespecially true when joint schemes of maneuver are highly interdependentand when the distributed node is already under stress to perform itsprimary mission. (33)

"What works in Red Flag and weapons school for C2 trainingwill work for CHQ C2." As we have seen above, the rest of theiceberg gets good training when large organizations have to work withother large organizations and merge their bureaucratic processes incommon directions. The tip-of-the-iceberg forces get good training whenthey have to adapt to changes to a plan that had already been providedin order to fulfill previously defined missions. Thus, with theexception of the combat operations floor, exercise events that usuallyoffer good training for the AOC (conducting parallel planning, rackingand stacking priorities, and resolving resource shortfall dilemmas)leave the tactical units spinning uselessly, losing valuable trainingtime while waiting for guidance. It is much better to have a controlled,constructive model for CHQ training in which a simulated air entity canhold endlessly while the staff works through its training objectives andperhaps learns more from a mistake than making the right call in thefirst place.

Similarly, trying to conduct AOC process training during a tacticalexercise with defined takeoff times, airspace, targets, and mandatorylists of players makes it impossible for AOC planners to exerciseoperational art in a real sense. In real life, the AOC's job is toask what problems should be solved and design feasible, creativesolutions for operational and tactical problems, which may or may notinvolve all of their assets. Thus, AOC play in a live or virtual eventin which players, roles, timing, and locations are defined is analogousto having to define and solve a word problem or receiving analready-solved algebra problem and being told to concoct a story aboutthe variables so that the predetermined flying or simulator schedulesolution makes sense. It is good exercise support for the tacticalunits, but it is not effective CHQ C2 training. If inexperienced AOCpersonnel serving as AOC response cells (i.e., people who createsimulated outputs from processes that aren't really happening tocreate a realistic training environment for others) don't know"what right looks like," then participation in Red Flag canactually constitute negative training. CHQ training has to do withprocesses, and CHQ processes do not happen when other headquarterselements are neither participating nor being simulated by someone else.

Having so many outstanding tactical C2 "hammers" in thetip and only a small cadre of identified CHQ C2 experts to consult onnew proposals makes it really easy to imagine that all CHQ problems are"nails." Recent proposals for the Advanced IntegratedWarfighting Weapons Instructor Course, designed by tactical C2integration experts to address issues in operational warfare, are goingin exactly the wrong direction for CHQ C2. Instead of doubling down ontactical experience by requiring participants to spend more time intheir specialized family-of-origin major weapons system as tacticalintegrators, we need to pull tacticians out of those systems sooner andteach them to be generalist, multidisciplinary CHQ planners andorganizational-process experts as senior captains and junior majors.(34) Doing so will give them more time to season in an actual CHQ ratherthan learn all of their CHQ C2 skills in classrooms and labs. It willallow them to bring real-world CHQ C2 experience into intermediatedevelopmental education and improve their capability to serve later asAOC and AFFOR division chiefs and directors, who need moreorganizational than tactical skills to perform their CHQ C2 missions.

Six Ways to Secure Operational-Level C2 Excellence

Given the requirements of operational C2 discussed previously andthe need for holistic systems literacy to be effective across theentirety of the C2 enterprise, we can make a few general recommendationsregarding requirements for maintaining current C2 capabilities in theface of increasing external and internal challenges.

Recognize That CHQ C2 Is Very Challenging and That How Well It IsDone Has a Significant Effect on Strategic Outcomes, with Far-ReachingConsequences for National Security and Prestige

CHQ C2 is not rocket science--it is much more difficult than that.When the hand moves the handle slightly at a component headquarters, theend of the tactical whip can quickly go supersonic. In other high-impactprofessions that require multidisciplinary knowledge to performcompetently, such as medicine or law, we demand extensive screening andprofessional preparation--including thorough testing and board screeningprocesses--before selecting someone for the task. CHQ C2 should be nodifferent. Assignments there should not be seen as the "alphatours" of old, a manning bill to be paid and escaped from as soonas possible to maintain career viability in a system biased more towardstactical achievement.

Acknowledge That the Heart of Operational C2 Is a Human Problem,Not a Technical One, Which Requires Specialized Organizational Skillsand Practical Experience Earned over Time to Build and Maintain C2Excellence

The skills necessary at this level are not identical to thoserequired at the tactical level. We must actively encourage and developdedicated, organizational-level C2 experts with the same rigor as we doat the tactical, identify and track them in the personnel system, andensure that CHQ C2 experts have career opportunities commensurate withthose available to tacticians and strategists. Organizational-level C2expertise must be multidisciplinary by nature, and those who practice itmust have a solid grounding in many different fields of theory andknowledge, as well as the organizational techniques to bring people andinsights from various fields into the same planning effort. (35) Thebackground that one needs to perform in the rest of the icebergincludes, but is not limited to, history, geography, decision theory,social and organizational theory, internal and external culturalawareness, awareness of the negative effects of cognitive bias, andfamiliarity with a number of analytical tools and group-planningtechniques that support good decision making. (36) Many of these skillstake years of concentrated study before their practitioners becomeproficient--skills not required or learned in the tactical assignmentsin which most members begin their career.

We also need to be more proactive in identifying individuals withthe aptitude and desire to assume the complex challenges oforganizational-level operational C2 and in consciously steering theminto viable career paths and command opportunities so they can build theexperience they need to lead the C2 enterprise later. This also includescreating squadron-command-equivalent billets within CHQ C2 assignmentsso that C2 leaders can compete for senior leadership positions later,along with the tactical specialists. It makes no sense to train peoplespecifically for multidisciplinary CHQ C2 positions but then insist thatthey spend the next four to six years commanding tactically focusedunits before they can use those skills again, thus allowing their CHQ C2skills to stagnate in the meantime. It leaves little time for thedeliberate engagement and reflection that our future CHQ C2 leaders needto propose innovative CHQ C2 solutions--the current CHQ C2 system is notthe final answer to our future rest-of-the-iceberg questions.

CHQ C2 assignments should be career enhancements, not speed bumpsto avoid. Because these jobs are inherently joint, steering our sharpestyoung minds towards them will increase our competence--hence,influence--in joint settings as well. The same young officers andnoncommissioned officers who rub shoulders with their sister-serviceequivalents in CHQ C2 assignments will surely see them again someday ina joint headquarters, the Pentagon, and possibly even in the"Tank"--and those personal relationships will pay dividends.(37) If the Air Force wants more say in joint planning and processes, itneeds to send Air Force people who can already speak in terms of jointplanning processes--not those who are just learning it on the fly aftera lifetime as inwardly focused Air Force tactical specialists.

Recognize That Tactical Proficiency in a Specific Mission DesignSeries and the Ability to "Speak Air Force" Are the Cost ofEntry but Are Not Sufficient in Themselves to Succeed at CHQ C2

Simply to survive in joint- and coalition-planning environments,organizational-level operational C2 practitioners must not only befamiliar with joint, allied, and sister-service doctrinal concepts andlanguage but also be conversant in several operational-planningmethodologies. They must be able to serve as translators betweendifferent service languages and cultures, but first they must haveproficiency of their own in terms of Air Force doctrine and C2terminology. They should begin their work in C2 with expertise in atleast one or more tactical areas, but they should not stay with onemission design series too long before receiving an operational C2assignment. This ensures that they have time to develop theorganizational skills needed to carry the air tasking cycle all the wayfrom strategy to task. Incentives should be offered to those who pursuesister-service PME after they complete Air Force PME. Allowing people toself-identify themselves for CHQ C2 assignments in such a way is a goodindicator of individuals who have the perspicacity and drive to make thedramatic shift from tactics, to operations, and eventually strategy.

Invest in In-Residence Initial and Advanced Training forOrganizational-Level Operational C2 Assignments, and Spread SpecializedEducation across a Career in the Same Way We Do with Our PME

Online AFFOR education is better than nothing, but it robs studentsof the opportunity to gather valuable insights gleaned from face-to-faceinteraction with experienced teachers who can tailor their instructionto specific requirements of the students and their assignments.Additionally, spreading out initial and advanced operational-level C2training--as was the practice between AOC initial qualification trainingand the Command and Control Warrior Advanced Course--allows students tosee a CHQ in action before reengaging in the theory. Doing so leads to aricher educational experience when they return to the classroom and evengreater dividends when they become advanced-training graduates.Requiring some experience between initial C2 training and advancedtraining will better prepare students to engage with the advancedmaterial, and they will even bring back new insights and lessons learnedthat will strengthen the entire community. CHQ skills require alifelong-learning mind-set, and our preparations for these positionsshould mirror this fact. It is good that some of our formal PME courseshave already incorporated CHQ C2 education and training into theirsyllabi, but it is also true that many of the people assigned to CHQ C2assignments have not yet attended these courses.

Continue to Invest in Organizational CHQ Operational C2 Exercisesand Encourage COCOM-Level Exercises to Include Training Objectives ThatInvolve CHQ Processes

Except for people who monitor and direct tactical execution (foundmostly in the COD), AOC and AFFOR players get useful mission trainingwhen they actually interact with the staffs and entities they would haveto talk to in real life to conduct joint and coalition parallelplanning, including active participation in joint battle-rhythmprocesses. Such training can occur in the context of major COCOMexercises like Terminal Fury, Austere Challenge, and Emerald Warrior, aswell as Blue Flag, in which those processes can be simulated with enoughfidelity to offer AOC personnel accurate inputs and useful critiques oftheir processes and products to facilitate learning. This does requirecommitment on the part of the primary training audience--usually theCOCOM staff--to create scenarios and master-scenario event lists thataddress AOC and AFFOR needs since these may be the only opportunitiesthat these entities have to fully exercise their C2 functions in thejoint boards, bureaus, centers, and cells that drive a joint battlerhythm.

Explore New Three-Dimensional Operational Graphics, Animations, andComputer Simulations to Raise General Awareness of "Rest of theIceberg" Issues and to Improve the Systems Literacy of Those WhoAre Not C2 Experts but Will Find Themselves Making Decisions about theC2 Enterprise

It is almost impossible to engage either creatively or criticallywith something without a basic mental model. Rich visualizations andanimation have an amazing power to access the creative mind and toinform our intuitions about systemic complexity. Even prespeech infantswho do not understand anything about the inner workings of computers caneasily manipulate computer interfaces of today to access and play theirfavorite video games on touch-screen devices using the visual metaphorsof Windows-based user interfaces. (38) We have an unprecedented abilityto use data to create empirically accurate simulations of operationalscenarios. We can and should visually depict our schemes of maneuver,using both rich, multidimensional graphics and simulations to help C2practitioners better visualize the operational constraints and linkagesthat make the rest-of-the-iceberg activities especially daunting. Thisis not to say that we should allow ourselves to be dependent on suchtools--the ultimate goal is still to build systemic intuition that canbe applied with a grease board as easily as a projector. Currently,however, the products we use are usually too simple for either educatingC2 or practicing high-level operational C2. We still employtwo-dimensional Microsoft Word and PowerPoint products to frame andwar-game complex, multidisciplinary operational problems in the planningprocess, and we too often present gross oversimplifications of complexplanning efforts to decision makers in three-to-four-slide quad-chartdecision briefings.

Animated operational graphics that utilize standard symbology--usedfrom initial education through actual mission rehearsals anddebriefings--will help us better illustrate joint interdependencies inways that static, two-dimensional products never can. Using them, we candevelop the same kind of intuitive feel for operational warfare that weexperience every time we use colored and animated weather maps toevaluate complex weather systems: within just a few seconds ofobservation, we can usually tell whether or not we need an umbrella. Ifwe had similar visual tools for operational-art concepts, it would bemuch more difficult to take for granted rest-of-the-iceberg operationalconsiderations like resource allocation and mutual interdependence ifthe simulation stops when it encounters a constraint. Airpower advocateAlexander de Seversky understood this concept well when he collabo ratedwith Walt Disney in making the film Victory through Air Power in 1943.De Seversky used simple, hand-animated operational graphics toillustrate complex concepts of operational art to the general public.Even if his message was at times overly simplistic, the explanatorypower of the animations is undeniable and, in many ways, superior to theway we teach the same operational concepts today. (39)

In an ideal situation, we could replace de Seversky's cartoonswith accurate, simulator-generated depictions of our operational schemesof maneuver and threats. We could play out an entire joint scheme ofmaneuver in a simulated battlespace, checking for seams in the plan andlimiting operational constraints before presenting joint courses ofaction to commanders. For example, if a joint plan called for moreair-refueling tanker gas than actually available, if the same asset wereassigned to multiple locations, or if an asset were planned to penetratean enemy's integrated air defense system without sufficient mutualsupport, then the simulation should highlight the discrepancy and pointto the limiting factors, in much the same way that commerciallyavailable strategy games do with combinations of color and sound alerts.We are already training a generation of gamers to think this way, so whyare we not training a generation of planners in a similar fashion?

Are we going to have this kind of modeling and briefing capabilitysoon? No. Would our situational awareness and systemic literacy benefitfrom the incremental steps it would take to get there, rather than justusing the static slides and diagrams we rely on today? Yes. And would ithelp us to make our planning assumptions explicit and open for debate,even if absolute systemic truth could never be depicted? Absolutely.

Conclusion

Any discussion of icebergs would have to include the tragedy of RMSTitanic--the largest, most advanced ship of its time, possessingstaggering levels of capacity, technology, prestige, and raw power. Manypeople, perhaps including some members of its crew, considered it"un sinkable." Of course, they didn't realize the dangerpresented by icebergs and how little steering command they had withtheir comparatively small rudder until it was too late.

This is not to say that having superior technology and the mostimpressive gear is undesirable in dangerous environments. Becausedeclining budgets will certainly prompt difficult choices, however, itis crucial to remember that tactical power is useless without sufficientC2 to direct it well. Our service needs a good CHQ C2 rudder and ahighly competent crew to direct it in order to avoid leaving AirForce-blue paint marks on an unexpected iceberg someday. (40)

The challenges involved in CHQ C2 and the skill sets needed toexecute the plans made there are not the same. The most important way tohedge against future C2 problems is to make sure we maintain--andinstitutionally value--a deep bench of people who have holistic C2systems literacy and creatively use the tools available to them to makethe needed communication and coordination happen. This means a continuedinvestment in the people, processes, and tools of CHQ C2, lest ourtactical excellence be all for naught.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in theJournal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carryingthe official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, AirEducation and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies ordepartments of the US government. This article may be reproduced inwhole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Air andSpace Power Journal requests a courtesy line.

Notes

(1.) For a detailed description of our current air and spaceoperations center and Air Force forces constructs and planningprocesses, see Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development andEducation, "Annex 3-30, Command and Control," 1 June 2007,https://doctrine .af.mil/download.jsp?filename =3-30-Annex-COMMAND-CONTROL.pdf.

(2.) For detailed information on Red Flag, see "414th CombatTraining Squadron 'Red Flag,'" Nellis Air Force Base, 6July 2012, http://www.nellis.af.mil/library/ffactsheets/ffactsheet.asp?id = 19160.

(3.) Martin van Creveld, "Command in War: A HistoricalOverview," in Advanced Technology Concepts for Command and Control,ed. Alexander Kott (Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2004), 27.

(4.) Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15March 2014), 45, http://www.dtic.mil /doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

(5.) Ibid.

(6.) Carl H. Builder, Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin, CommandConcepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), xiii-xiv,http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR775.html.

(7.) The Joint Air Operations Command and Control system and itssubordinate systems are described in JP 3-30, Command and Control forJoint Air Operations, 10 February 2014, II-7-II-13,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf.

(8.) For a plethora of guides and descriptions on the subject ofoperational art, see "Air War College Gateway to theInternet," Air University, accessed 3 June 2014,http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-forc.htm#opart.

(9.) Air Force organizational descriptions can be found in AirForce Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization, 16 March 2011,http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/aff_a1/publication/afi38-101/afi38-101.pdf. Component major commands aredescribed in par. 2.2.2.2. Component numbered air forces are describedin par. 2.2.5.1.

(10.) Although difficult to find, the most concise description ofthe AOC is "The CAOC Primer" by Col Dale Shoupe, USAF,retired, a 2008 lesson reading from Air War College. For the official USAir Force description of AOC and AFFOR functions, see Curtis E. LeMayCenter for Doctrine Development and Education, Volume 4, Operations, 5June 2013, "Appendix: The Air Operations Center,"https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename = V4-D31-Appendix-AOC.pdf.

(11.) See Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development andEducation, Volume 1, Basic Doctrine, 14 October 2011, "Air ForceComponent Presentation Considerations," https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename =V1-D45-AF-Presentation-Consider.pdf. See also Curtis E. LeMay Center forDoctrine Development and Education, Volume 4, Operations, "Commandand Control Mechanisms,"https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename =V4-D11-C2-mechanisms.pdf.

(12.) For an excellent discussion of both tip andrest-of-the-iceberg C2 activities and where they fit within the jointconcept of "mission command," see Col Dale S. Shoupe, USAF,Retired, "An Airman's Perspective on Mission Command,"Air and Space Power Journal 26, no. 5 (September-October 2012): 95-108,http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2012-Sep-Oct/V-Shoupe.pdf.

(13.) For a description of the joint operation planning process forair, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,III-1-III-15. For information on the joint operations planning process,see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, chap. 4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.

(14.) These plans include the joint air operations plan (JAOP), airoperations directives (AOD), air tasking orders (ATO), AFFOR operationorders (OPORD), and various other subordinate plans, branch plans, andsequel plans.

(15.) For a description of this exercise, see "BlueFlag," 505th Command and Control Wing, 10 April 2013,http://www.505ccw.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id =15317.

(16.) George l. Seffers, "U.S. Air Force Races to ModernizeCritical Battle Control System," Signal Online, 1 August 2013,http://www.afcea.org/content/?q = node/11453.

(17.) The Joint Operational Access Concept and its subordinateconcepts--the Navy/Air Force-authored Air Sea Battle Concept and theArmy/Marine Corps-authored Gaining and Maintaining Access--all call forincreased integration among the services, all of which are fundamentallyproblems that must initially be solved at the JTF and CHQ C2-equivalentlevel before they are implemented by subordinate C2 nodes in tacticalexecution. See Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept(JOAC), version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 January2012), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%20 2012_signed.pdf;Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to AddressAnti-Access and Area Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: Air-Sea BattleOffice, May 2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf; andUS Army and US Marine Corps, Gaining and Maintaining Access: AnArmy-Marine Corps Concept (Washington, DC: US Army and US Marine Corps,March 2012), http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/Army%20Marine%20Corp%20Gaining%20and%20 Maintaining%20Access.pdf.

(18.) One must be a squadron, group, and wing commander to become ageneral officer. Thus, many of the people who have to pass through thesewickets and still make the necessary gates and timing can afford tospend only a single-year or two-year tour at the most on the way up thechain. There are no squadron command opportunities in CHQ that I amaware of outside the 505th Command and Control Wing assignments, andpersonnel are still nominated for command by their old major weaponssystem porch. Consequently, if individuals go to an AOC or AFFOR asmajors, there's a good chance that they are alienating the peoplewho would otherwise have to choose them for that crucial squadroncommand position at a sufficiently young age to be marked off forpossible wing command track.

(19.) For an excellent summary of some of the latest research onbuilding expertise and mastery, see Dan Goleman, Focus: The HiddenDriver of Excellence (New York: Harper, 2013); and Gary Klein,Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive DecisionMaking (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).

(20.) For the classic analysis of Air Force service culture, aswell as an analysis of the institutional ethos of all of the US militaryservices, see Carl Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Stylesin Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,1989).

(21.) See Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

(22.) The mission of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studiesis to "Educate strategists for the Air Force and the Nation."See "About SAASS," School of Advanced Air and Space Studies,accessed 3 June 2014, http://usafsaass.blogspot.com/p/about-saass.html.Thus, the decision to curtail C2 training to focus on larger strategyissues in an era of budget austerity is both in line with SAASS'sprimary emphasis and appropriate. The school's curriculum doesinclude operational-level warfare concepts in its lessons, providingsome engagement with CHQ C2 concepts. The primary gap left by thecurtailment of 505th Command and Control Wing training is the chance forSAASS students to engage with highly experienced JFACC senior mentorsand the Operational Command Training Program instructors, whocollectively have centuries of CHQ C2 experience. They are also currenton worldwide CHQ C2 configurations due to their frequent rotations intothe field conducting exercise support. The larger issue with C2education is the systemic one beyond the scope of SAASS. The Air Forcedoes not make expertise in operational C2 a prerequisite--or evenpreferred--to attend SAASS, despite the fact that many of its graduateswill be expected to lead joint and Air Force planning efforts asoperational planning team leads in their "payback"assignments. In the latter, they will work side by side with graduatesof the School of Advanced Military Studies, School of AdvancedWarfighting, Maritime Advanced Warfighting School, and Joint AdvancedWarfighting School who have been specifically trained inhigher-headquarters-level C2 planning processes. Thus, there is anexpectation of CHQ C2 proficiency in SAASS graduates in the field and inthe personnel system but no guarantee that they will possess it whenthey arrive at CHQ C2 assignments as operational planning team leads ordivision directors.

(23.) For a brief description of the evolution of the air componentcoordination element, which will be referred to as the joint aircomponent coordination element in future doctrine documents, see Maj GenKenneth S. Wilsbach and Lt Col David J. Lyle, "NATO AirCommand-Afghanistan: The Continuing Evolution of Airpower Command andControl," Air and Space Power Journal 28, no. 1 (January-February2014): 11-25, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2014-Jan-Feb/SLP-Wilsbach-Lyle.pdf.

(24.) Dr. Tom Ehrhard (remarks during the School of Advanced Airand Space Studies "Grad Jam," Maxwell AFB, AL, Spring 2011).

(25.) Nola Taylor Redd, "Stephen Hawking Biography,"Space.com, 30 May 2012, http://www.space.com/15923-stephen-hawking.html.

(26.) Not to be taken literally, this is a common expression usedby people forced to adapt various program-of-record C2 systems tonon-program-of-record systems that are not designed or upgradedtogether. This usually results in disconnects between the C2 systemsused for mission accomplishment and the constructive simulations ofreal-world inputs, such as radar feeds and message traffic during C2training. Additionally, cross-domain security-level transfer issuesoften must be overcome creatively when working with different CHQ C2entities. Despite the existence of baseline AOC systems, each AOC adaptsto fit its particular local situation (including establishingconnectivity with host nation and coalition forces), so each trainingevent requires unique information technology solutions to facilitate it.The further that program-of-record systems advance compared to thetraining and testing systems with which they must connect, the morechallenging becomes the prospect of keeping the systems compatible.

(27.) This is overreach typically ascribed to those advocatingapproaches based on the philosophy of network-centric warfare, bestdescribed in ADM A. K. Cebrowski, The Implementation of Network CentricWarfare (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of ForceTransformation, 5 January 2005),http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/oft_implementation_ncw%5B1%5D.pdf. See also publications by the Departmentof Defense's C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, such as David S.Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network CentricWarfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd ed. rev.(Washington, DC: CCRP, 2000),http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf; and David S. Alberts andRichard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command ... Control ... in the Information Age (Washington, DC: CCRP, 2005),http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts _Power.pdf. For the most currentCCRP documents, see "The Command and Control ResearchProgram," accessed 3 June 2014, http://www.dodccrp.org/.

(28.) Using three domains to approximate reality has manyhistorical antecedents, including versions by Plato through J. F. C.Fuller and John Boyd. For the purposes of this article, the domains aredefined as follows: physical domain (the physical artifacts of theworld, including the earth, ourselves, our tools, and theelectromagnetic spectrum); cognitive domain (the means by which weprocess information from the physical world through a combination ofindividual neurobiological processes, social interaction, andinteraction with the physical domain using various forms of informationtechnologies; this also includes the subconscious processing ofinformation in the human brain); moral domain (the uniquely human domainthat defines the personal and collective meanings of the information weprocess in the cognitive domain; this includes the conscious portion ofhuman thought and memory that interprets the various signals produced inthe cognitive domain and gives them meaning in a social sense). For moreexplanation, see Lt Col David J. Lyle, "Complexity, Neuroscience,Networks, and Violent Extremism: Foundations for an OperationalApproach," in Tools for Operational Considerations: Insights fromNeurobiology and Neuropsychology on Influence and Extremism--AnOperational Perspective, ed. Col Marty Reynolds and Lt Col David Lyle(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2013), 64-65,http://nsiteam .com/scientist/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Influence-and-Extremism-White-Paper -Approved-for-Public-Release-30Apr13v3R.pdf.

(29.) For a discussion of sociological factors pertaining tooperational C2 in CHQ C2 settings, see Dr. Hriar Cabayan et al., eds.,Humans in the Loop: Validation and Validity Concepts in the SocialSciences in the Context of Applied and Operational Settings, StrategicMultilayer Assessment Occasional White Paper (Washington, DC: JointChiefs of Staff, August 2013),http://nsiteam.com/scientist/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/U_Social-Science-II-White -Paper-Approved-for-Public-Release-26Aug13.pdf.

(30.) For a typical critique of network-centric warfare andconcepts deriving from it, see Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The SevenDeadly Sins of Network Centric Warfare," US Naval InstituteProceedings 125, no. 1 (January 1999): 36-39,http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999-01/seven-deadly-sins-network-centric-warfare. See alsoMary Sterpka King, "Preparing the Instantaneous Battlespace: ACultural Examination of Network-Centric Warfare," Topia, nos. 23-24(2010): 304-29, http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/topia/article/view/31834. For an excellent critical analysis of the systemsthinking behind the concepts of network-centric warfare, see Sean T.Lawson, Nonlinear Science and Warfare: Chaos, Complexity, and the USMilitary in the Information Age (New York: Routledge, 2014).

(31.) A popular saying among forward planning elements,"virtual presence equals actual absence," reflects aperception problem that CHQ C2 headquarters constantly have unless theyalso possess effective liaisons placed forward to provide the"actual presence." See Wilsbach and Lyle, "NATO AirCommand-Afghanistan," for a brief description of the evolution ofthe air component coordination element, which will be referred to as thejoint air component coordination element in future doctrine documents.

(32.) The most significant revelations in recent cognitiveneuroscience are not that we have unconscious processes that driveconscious thought; rather, they reflect the realization that we havevery little conscious access to them in most cases. Several notable,recent works summarize some of these findings at a level accessible tothe general reader; the most no table is Thinking Fast and Slow by NobelLaureate economist Daniel Kahneman (New York: Farrar, Strauss, andGiroux, 2011). See also David Eagleman, Incognito: The Secret Lives ofthe Brain (New York: Random House, 2011); Duncan J. Watts, Everything IsObvious (Once You Know the Answer): How Common Sense Fails Us (New York:Crown Business, 2011); Shankar Vendantam, The Hidden Brain: How OurUnconscious Minds Elect Presidents, Control Markets, Wage Wars, and SaveOur Lives (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2010); and Michael S. Gazzaniga,Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (New York:HarperCollins, 2011).

(33.) See the discussion of C2 systems "coupling" in LtCol Michael Kometer, Command in Air War: Centralized versusDecentralized Control of Combat Airpower (Maxwell AFB, AL: AirUniversity Press, June 2007), 60-62,http://www.au.af.mil/au/aupress/digital/pdf/book/b_0107_kometer_command_air_war.pdf.

(34.) The advanced integrated war-fighting concept calls for 10years in the primary Air Force specialty code and 120 months ofoperational flying duty accumulation (OFDA) for aircrews beforeattending the Advanced Integrated Warfighting Weapons Instructor Course,including three years of instructor experience in their family-of-origintactical weapons system. Instead, personnel showing interest and promisefor CHQ C2 should be allowed to leave with 100 months OFDA and serve inAFFOR and AOC positions after seven years of flying. Doing so will allowthem to gain between two and four years of CHQ C2 experience and remaincompetitive for intermediate developmental education attendance,including participation in the Advanced Studies Group programs (Schoolof Advanced Air and Space Studies [SAASS], School of Advanced MilitaryStudies [SAMS], School of Advanced Warfighting [SAW], Marine AdvancedWarfighting School [MAWS]) along normal timelines.

(35.) The benefits of multidisciplinary approaches to problemsolving are detailed in Steven Johnson's Where Good Ideas ComeFrom: The Natural History of Innovation (New York: Riverhead Books,2010); and Scott E. Page's The Difference: How the Power ofDiversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

(36.) For an excellent discussion of individual and group biasesthat influence decision making, see Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology ofIntelligence Analysis (McLean, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs /psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychofIntelNew.pdf;Strategic Multilayer Assessment Editorial Board, From the Mind to theFeet: Assessing the Perception-to-Intent-to-Action Dynamic (Maxwell AFB,AL: Air University Press, 2011),http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afri /from_the_mind_to_the_feet.pdf;and Dylan Evans, Risk Intelligence: How to Live With Uncertainty (NewYork: Free Press, 2012). For a detailed description of multiframereferencing in operational processes, see Dr. Chris Paparone, TheSociology of Military Science: Prospects for Postinstitutional MilitaryDesign (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).

(37.) It is highly likely that the field grade officers who serveas joint planners during the contingencies of today will end up beingthe O-6s and general/flag officers of tomorrow. Building strong personalrelationships over years can only improve trust and honest dealing wheninstitutional preferences clash in the future, ultimately resolved bythe most senior officers making decisions in places like the"Tank," where the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff usetheir staffs' recommendations to collectively make decisions thataffect the entire joint force. Anecdotally, the author challenges thereader to find any senior leader with experience in either situation whowill say that personal relationships with members from the otherservices were not critical to achieving positive outcomes.

(38.) For an excellent presentation on the power of visualization,see the TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) talk by DavidMcCandless, "The Beauty of Data Visualization," video, 17:56,July 2010, http://www.ted.com/talks/david_mccandless_the_beauty_of_data_visualization; and Eric Berlow, "SimplifyingComplexity," video, 3:42, TED, July 2010,http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_berlow_how_complexity_leads_to_simplicity.For a study of using visualization for campaign planning, see MAJRichard D. Paz, "Visualizing War: Visual Technologies and MilitaryCampaign Planning," research paper (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US ArmyCommand and General Staff College, 2003),http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate /army/visualizing_war.pdf.

(39.) Review of Victory through Air Power by Alexander de Seversky(Disney Studios), 1943, Youtube video, 1:05:20, accessed 16 May 2014,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = J7Nj J59bf0M/.

(40.) Alasdair Wilkins, "What Happened to the Iceberg ThatSank the Titanic?," Wired, 16 April 2012,http://www.wired.com/2012/04/titanic-iceberg-history//.

Lieutenant Colonel Lyle (USAFA; MBA, Louisiana Tech; MMAS, US ArmyCommand and General Staff College; MAAS, School of Advanced Air andSpace Studies) has recently been assigned to the Curtis E. LeMay Centerfor Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He hasserved in various assignments related to command and control in the past10 years, including air and space operations center (AOC) assignments atthe 613 AOC and combined air operations center; Pacific Air ForcesInspector General AOC inspector; director of operations for the 505thCombat Training Squadron; various assignments in joint air componentcoordination elements, including serving as the A-5 (Strategic Plans) ofthe 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan in Kabul; anddirector of staff for the 505th Command and Control Wing, HurlburtField, Florida. He was an AOC initial qualification training honorgraduate and Command and Control Warrior Advanced Course graduate,holding US Army qualifications as a joint planner and distinguishedmaster strategist. A master navigator with more than 2,400 flying hoursin the B-52H, Lieutenant Colonel Lyle flew 43 combat missions overKosovo and Afghanistan.